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THE USE OF RACE IN THE ADMISSIONS
PROGRAMS OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS - A VIOLATION OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE?
The Effect of Hopwood v. State of Texas, et al.1
I. INTRODUCTION
"The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is no
more rational on its own terms than would be choices based upon
the physical size or blood type of applicants."2
Race-conscious programs are on trial in America. Few
debates invoke the level of controversy and spark the human emo-
tions and frustrations, as does the debate concerning race-con-
scious programs. The debate erects a dividing line between people
with starkly different views as to how our society should treat
people of color. The debate focuses on the appropriateness, effec-
tiveness, benefits, and fairness of programs using racial
classifications.
The legacy of slavery and pervasive discrimination against
African-Americans unfortunately permeates our Nation's history.
3
Consequently, African-Americans represent the paradigmatic
group for those arguing for the necessity and inclusion of race-
conscious programs.4
Proponents of race-conscious programs argue that the ves-
tiges of past discrimination maintain barriers to African-Ameri-
cans. They point to President Lyndon B. Johnson's vivid imagery
as a continual reminder that, "You do not take a person, who for
years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up
to the starting line of a race, and then say, 'You are free to com-
pete with all the others,' and still justly believe that you have been
1. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
2. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945.
3. Tanya Y. Murphy, An Argument For Diversity Based Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 1995, 95 ANN. Strav. AM. L. 515, 518 (1995).
4. Id.
489
1
Joyner: The Use of Race in the Admissions Programs of Higher Educational
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
completely fair."5 These proponents believe that discrimination is
still an active problem and that substantial progress toward level-
ing the playing field among African-Americans and caucasians
will not be made without programs which consider race.
Those opposing race-conscious programs argue that the use of
racial classifications fails to effectively create or maintain an equi-
table playing field by alleviating the effects of past societal dis-
crimination. They claim that the current and continued use of
such programs fail to create an equitable opportunity for all, and
such preferential programs effectively create "reverse discrimina-
tion" which further divides the races in America. The Supreme
Court has stated, "racial preferences appear 'to even the score'...
only if one embraces the proposition that our society is appropri-
ately viewed as divided into races, making it right that an injus-
tice rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated
for by discriminating against a white."6
Institutions of higher education have traditionally used race
as a factor in their admissions programs. The use of race in
admissions programs ranges from using race to using race as the
deciding factor. However, as the national debate over race-con-
scious programs rages, the constitutional validity of these admis-
sions programs is being challenged.7 As a result, many have
urged the American judicial system to resolve the controversy by
invalidating such programs on constitutional grounds.8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v. Texas 9
addressed whether race could be used as a factor in an educational
institution's admissions program. The University of Texas law
school operated a dual track admissions program which granted
preferential treatment to African-American and Mexican-Ameri-
can applicants. 10 The Supreme Court has recently found that all
race-conscious programs are inherently suspect in light of the
Equal Protection Clause and must be subjected to the strictest of
scrutiny." In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, schools using race-
5. Id. at 515 (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights,
Address at the Howard University Commencement Ceremony, June 4, 1965,
shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
6. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term, Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 89 (Nov. 1996).
8. Id. at 90.
9. 78 F.3d 932.
10. See discussion infra part II.
11. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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conscious programs must demonstrate that their program both
serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tai-
lored to meet that interest.' 2 The law school proffered that their
admissions program served two compelling governmental inter-
ests by remedying the present effects of past discrimination and
promoting diversity within their student body.13
The Fifth Circuit rejected both of the law school's proposals
for compelling governmental interests and held that the program
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amende-
ment. First, the court in Hopwood refused to adhere to Justice
Powell's opinion in the University of California v. Bakke14 which
intimated that race may be used as a factor in admissions pro-
grams to promote diversity. Hopwood held that race could not be
used as a proxy for diversity because the use of race in any man-
ner fosters impermissible stereotyping of individuals based on the
color of their skin.' 5 The court concluded that race could never be
used as a factor in admissions programs to promote diversity as a
compelling governmental interest.
Second, the court in Hopwood acknowledged that attempts to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination serves a compel-
ling governmental interest.16 However, the court found that
insufficient evidence existed to show that the admissions program
was remedying the present effects of past discrimination by the
law school. 17
Hopwood severely restricted the use of race as a factor in
admissions programs for educational institutions in the Fifth Cir-
cuit."" The Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari to Hopwood,
thus prolonging the debate as to whether race should be used as a
factor in school admissions programs. 19
12. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §14.3, at
602 (5th ed. 1995).
13. See infra notes 50-51 accompanying text.
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1979). In Bakke, the plaintiff claimed that the dual track
admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Protection Clause. See discussion infra part IIIA.
15. Hopwood,78 F.3d at 945-46.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 962. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text; see also
discussion infra IV.A.2.
18. . The decision in Hopwood focused on the role of race in the admissions
process of law schools. The legal principles encompassed in the case could easily
be applied to other areas of higher education.
19. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
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This Note examines the burden placed on educational institu-
tions to justify race-conscious admissions programs in light of the
Equal Protection Clause.20 First, this note reviews the facts of the
case and the decision in Hopwood. Next, this note provides a
background of the law applicable to race-conscious programs by
examining: (1) University of California v. Bakke; (2) the underly-
ing theories of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) the
strict scrutiny standard of review; and (4) the Fourth Circuit's
1994 decision to invalidate a university's race-conscious scholar-
ship program in Podberesky v. Kirwan.
Finally, this note analyzes the decision by the Fifth Circuit.
The analysis reveals that the decision in Hopwood was overly
broad in finding that race could never be used to achieve diversity.
However, the analysis shows that the argument suggested by
Hopwood that race should not be used as a proxy for diversity is
provocative. The analysis explains the difficulty that race-con-
scious admissions programs have with sustaining constitutional
validity, and suggests alternatives to using race in admissions.
II. THE CASE
The University of Texas School of Law consistently ranks as
one of the nation's leading law schools. 21 Admission to the school
is intensely competitive.22 In a given year, the applicant pool con-
sists of over 4,000 applicants, many of whom maintain some of the
highest grades and test scores in the country, competing for an
eventual entering class of 500.21
In the early 1990's, the law school operated a race-conscious
dual track admissions program. The school operated one admis-
sions program for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans and
maintained another separate admissions program for the remain-
der of the applicants. The school reviewed the applicants differ-
20. The purpose of this Note is to examine and outline the difficulty that
school admissions programs which use race as a factor in their admissions have
when confronted by Equal Protection scrutiny. This Note does not serve as a
persuasive argument for either side of the race-conscious programs debate. The
Note is intended to objectively portray the current state of the law in this area
and to critically analyze the reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood.
21. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935 (quoting U.S. NEWS AND WoRLD REPORT, Mar. 20,
1995, at 84 (national survey ranking of seventeenth)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
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ently, separating the applicants into one of two groups based on
the race of the applicant.
Due to the enormous pool of applicants each year, the law
school has traditionally relied on numerical data in its admission
process.2 4 In 1992, the law school based its initial admissions
decision upon an index figure ("TI"). The TI consisted of a compos-
ite of undergraduate grade point average ("GPA") and Law School
Aptitude Test ("LSAT") score. 25 Based solely on their TI admis-
sions score, the school sorted candidates into one of the following
three categories: (1) "presumptive admit;" (2) "presumptive deny;"
or (3) "discretionary zone."26
Those applicant's whose TI admissions score placed them in
either the "presumptive admit" or "presumptive deny" categories
received little review. 2 7 Such placement resulted in the "presump-
tive admit" applicants receiving offers for admission and the "pre-
sumptive deny" applicants being denied admission.28  However,
the applicants placed in the "discretionary zone" received a more
29extensive review.
Although the TI admissions score sorted all applicants into
one of the three categories, the TI ranges for placing applicants
into these categories varied depending on the race of the appli-
cant.3 0 The school lowered the TI ranges used for initial sorting
for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans. 31 The minimum
24. Id.
25. Id. at 935 n.1. The formulae, known as the "Texas Index," was written by
the Law School Data Assembly Service according to a prediction derived from the
success of first-year students in preceding years. The formulae required an
approximate 60% weight to LSAT scores and 40% to GPA. In addition to the
numerical data, the law school considered such qualitative factors as the
strength of an applicant's undergraduate education, the difficulty of the
applicant's major, significant trends in both the applicant's grades as well as the
trends in grades at the applicant's undergraduate institution, and additional
qualities the applicant would provide the incoming class. These qualitative
factors were extremely important to consideration of marginal candidates.
26. Id. at 935.
27. Id. at 935-936.
28. Id. at 936.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The consequence of using different ranges greatly affected an
applicant's opportunity for admission. There existed a certain range of TI
admission scores for which African-American and Mexican American applicant's
would be placed in the "presumptive admit" category while all other applicant's
with the same TI admission score would be placed in the "presumptive deny"
category.
493
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TI score for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans was 189
to be placed in the "presumptive admit" category and 179 for the
"presumptive denial" category. 2 In contrast, the minimum TI
score for all other applicants was 199 for the "presumptive admit"
category" and 192 for the "presumptive denial" category.3 3
The reduced range of TI scores for African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans allowed the law school to consider and admit
more individuals from these specified groups.84 The law school
lowered the TI admission score in an attempt to meet an "aspira-
tion" of admitting a class of African-Americans and Mexican-
Americans which was roughly proportionate to the percentages of
those races graduating from undergraduate institutions in
Texas. 5
In addition to using different TI admission scores, the law
school used a segregated application evaluation process. The pro-
cess required that every African-American and Mexican American
applicant within the "discretionary zone" receive an extensive
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. In 1992, the white residents (for simplicity, Hopwood designated all
non-preferred candidates as "white") had a mean GPA of 3.25 and an LSAT of
164. Resident Mexican American applicants had a mean GPA of 3.27 and an
LSAT of 158; African-Americans had a mean GPA of 3.25 and an LSAT of 157.
"On the basis of the median LSArs national distribution percentile, one-half of
the law school's white resident applicants were in the top 9% of all test-takers,
one-half of the resident Mexican Americans were in the top 25% of all test-
takers, and one-half of the resident blacks were in the top 22% of test-takers."
The differing standards greatly affected a candidate's chance of admissions.
"[Blecause the presumptive denial score for white applicants was a TI of 192 or
lower, and the presumptive admit TI for preferred candidates was 189 or higher,
a preferred candidate with a TI of 189 or above almost certainly would have been
admitted, even though [that score] was considerably below the level at which a
white candidate almost certainly would have been rejected." Id. To illustrate
the difference, consider that for an applicant with a GPA of 3.8, to avoid
presumptive denial as a white by obtaining a TI score of 193 or above, the LSAT
had to be at least 155. This score would be approximately in the top 32% of test-
takers. In contrast, if the same applicant were African-American, thus needing a
TI score of 180 to avoid presumptive denial, the applicant would have to score a
142 on the LSAT. This score would rank the applicant in only the top 80% of
test-takers. Id. Therefore, the disparate classification of applicants according to
race would clearly result in the opportunity and ultimate admission of more
minority applicants.
35. Id. at 937. The rough percentages of those graduating from Texas
colleges included approximately 5% African-Americans and 10% Mexican
Americans. The law school was constantly adjusting its TI range over the course
of the admissions process in an attempt to achieve the desired proportions.
[Vol. 19:489494
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review by one three-member minority subcommittee.3 6 A number
of different subcommittees reviewed the remaining applicants
within the "discretionary zone."3 7 Therefore, the admissions pro-
cess failed to compare African-American and Mexican-American
applicants with the rest of the applicant pool at any time during
the process."' The law school also maintained segregated waiting
lists based on race and residence.3 9
Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot, and David
Rogers were among the white applicants who applied for admis-
sion to the 1992 entering law school class.' Based on their TI
admissions scores, the school placed these applicants in the "dis-
cretionary zone."" If any of the four applicants had been African-
American or Mexican-American, their respective TI score would
have placed each of them in the "presumptive admit" category.42
Such a classification would have assured these applicants admis-
sion to the law school.43 However, upon being placed in the "dis-
cretionary zone," all four applicants were eventually denied
admission into the 1992 entering law school class.4"
These four applicants brought suit in federal district court
primarily under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 5 The plaintiffs' contended that they were discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race by the law school's process of
evaluating their admissions. 46 The district court subjected the
36. Id.
37. Id..
38. Id. at 938.
39. Id.
40. Id. Cheryl Hopwood's TI admission score was actually a 199, based upon
her 3.8 GPA and the equivalent of a 160 LSAT score, but she was dropped from
the "presumptively admit" category to the "discretionary zone" because the law
school determined that her undergraduate GPA was overstated by her
educational background. Carvell, Elliot, and Rogers had a TI score of 197.
41. Id. at 938.
42. Id. at 936.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 938. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36.
45. Id. at 938. The plaintiffs also claimed derivative statutory violations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000d.
The suit was brought against the following defendants: the State of Texas, the
University of Texas Board of Regents, the University of Texas at Austin, the
President of the University of Texas at Austin, the University of Texas Law
School, the dean of the law school, and the Chairman of the Admissions
Committee. All individuals were sued in their official capacity.
46. Id.
495
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program to strict scrutiny and found that two justifications prof-
fered by the law school for using race in the admissions process
served as compelling governmental interests.4 7 These justifica-
tions were: (1) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
racially and ethnically diverse student body ("diversity") and (2)
remedying the present effects of past discrimination ("remedial
purpose"). 48
Despite finding constitutionally valid reasons for using race
in the admissions program, the district court determined that the
admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause.4 9 This
violation resulted from the program's deferential treatment of
candidates of different races without comparing the candidates of
different races with one another at some point in the admissions
process.5 0 However, the district court granted virtually no relief
to the plaintiffs, therefore, the plaintiffs appealed the verdict.5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the
defendants failed to submit any constitutionally "compelling" rea-
sons for the use of race in the admissions program of the law
school.5 2 The Fifth Circuit refused to adhere to the portion of Jus-
tice Powell's opinion in Bakke suggesting that achieving diversity
in an educational institution could be a constitutionally "compel-
ling" reason to use race in an admissions process. 53 As a result,
47. Id. See discussion of compelling governmental interest and the strict
scrutiny standard of review infra part III.C.1.
48. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551, 571-572. The district court found that the
entire State of Texas' institutions of higher education would be used to determine
if any present effects of past discrimination existed. The district court found
three present effects of past discrimination: (1) "the law school's lingering
reputation in the minority community, particularly with prospective students, as
a 'white school'; (2) an under-representation of minorities in the student body;
and (3) some perception that the law school is a hostile environment for
minorities."
49. Id. at 579.
50. Id.
51. The district court not only failed to order that the plaintiffs be admitted to
law school, but the district court also refused to enjoin the law school from using
race in admissions decisions. The district court determined that the only
appropriate relief was a declaratory judgment and an order to allow the plaintiffs
to reapply to the school of law without charge. The plaintiffs were awarded
damages of only a one-dollar nominal award to each plaintiff. Hopwood, 738 F.3d
at 939.
52. Id. at 962.
53. Id. For a discussion of Justice Powell's opinion, see infra text
accompanying notes 73-87. In fact, the court found that diversity, in and of itself,
was not a compelling governmental interest which is necessary to meet the strict
[Vol. 19:489496
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the court found that the law school may not consider race as a
factor in admissions in order to achieve diversity in its student
body.54
The Fifth Circuit also found that remedial admissions pro-
gram may serve a compelling governmental interest, but these
programs could not be sustained based entirely on societal dis-
crimination.55 Relying extensively on the 1994 ruling by the
Fourth Circuit in Podberesky v. Kerwin,5 6 the Court of Appeals
found that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding
that any present effects of discriminatory practices resulted from
the past discrimination by the law school.57 The Court of Appeals
granted the plaintiffs the opportunity to reapply to the law school
under an admissions program that did not use race as a factor in
admissions and remanded to the district court to reconsider the
question of damages.58
In a separate concurrence, Judge Wiener agreed that the
admissions program was unconstitutional, but he viewed the opin-
ion of the majority panel as overly broad.59 He stated the majority
unnecessarily concluded that the use of race in the admissions
program to achieve diversity would never serve as a compelling
governmental interest.60 Even assuming that diversity in educa-
tion could serve as a compelling governmental interest, Judge
Wiener asserted that this particular dual track admissions pro-
gram was not narrowly tailored and clearly failed to meet consti-
tutional validity. 1
scrutiny test for constitutional validity. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995); see also the discussion concerning strict scrutiny infra
parts III.B. and III.C.1.
54. Hopwood, 738 F.3d at 962.
55. Id.
56. Podberesky v. Kerwin, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct.
2001 (1995).
57. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-953.
58. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-953.
59. Id. at 962-963.
60. Id. See the discussion concerning compelling governmental interests and
strict scrutiny infra parts III.B. and III.C.1.
61. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 966. See discussion of Judge Wiener's concurring
opinion infra part V.B.1.
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III. BACKGROUND
A The Initial Look at the Use of Race in Admissions Programs
in Higher Education- Regent's of the University of
California v. Bakke62
The Supreme Court first looked at race-conscious programs in
higher education nineteen years ago in Regent's of the University
of California v. Bakke."3 Since 1978, Bakke has become the cor-
nerstone for analyzing non-remedial race-conscious educational
programs .6 In 1973 and 1974, the University of California at
Davis School of Medicine denied admission to Allan Bakke, a
white male, although his academic qualifications were considera-
bly higher than those of minority candidates who were admitted.6 5
The medical school operated a dual track admissions program
which consisted of one tract of admissions for the general popula-
tion and a separate, "special admissions" tract for certain minori-
ties and "disadvantaged" persons.66 The medical school allotted
16 seats out of an incoming class of 100 under this special admis-
sions program.e7 At no time during the admissions process were
the minority and "disadvantaged" applicants who were competing
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1979).
63. Id. For an in-depth analysis of Bakke, see NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
12, §14.10, at 711-21.
64. Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM.
& MARY BmL RTs. J. 881, 883 (1996).
65. 438 U.S. at 277 n.7. See Chin, supra note 64, at 883. For example,
Bakke's undergraduate science grade point average ("GPA") was 3.44 and his
overall GPA was 3.46. In comparison, the 1973 entering class from the special
admissions program had an average science GPA of class of 1973 had an average
science GPA of 2.62 and an overall average GPA of 2.88. In 1974, those entering
the school via the special admissions program had an average science GPA of
2.42 and an overall average GPA of 2.62. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277 n.7.
66. 438 U.S. at 272-73, 275. The medical school's admission program
considered race, educational background, and economic deprivation to determine
whether a student qualified as disadvantaged. Applying candidates were asked
to indicate whether they wished to be considered as "economically and/or
educationally disadvantaged" applicants, as well as whether they wished to be
considered as members of a minority group. The Medical School apparently
viewed the minority group as "Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American
Indians." "No formal definition of "disadvantaged" was ever produced, but the
chairman of the special committee screened each application to see whether it
reflected economic or educational deprivation." Once an applicant was placed
into the special admissions program the applicant received a more lenient review
of GPA and standardized test scores. Id. at 274-275.
67. Id. at 274.
498 [Vol. 19:489
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for the 16 allotted seats ever compared with the general appli-
cants.68 Allan Bakke challenged the medical school's race-con-
scious "special admissions" program claiming that it violated both
his constitutional right under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.69
A divided Court in Bakke failed to deliver a majority opinion,
however, five Justices, for differing reasons, found the program in
violation of Title VT. 70 A majority of the Court did reach the Equal
Protection Clause issue, however, only Justice Powell found that
the program violated the Constitution.7 '
Justice Powell's opinion provided the swing vote to invalidate
the admissions program and became the subject of numerous
debates. 72 Justice Powell addressed the constitutional issue and
found that the admissions program violated the Equal Protection
68. Id.
69. Id. at 277-278.
70. Id. at 271-272. Six justices filed separate opinions with none of the
opinions garnering more than four votes.
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72. Four of the justices - Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens - concluded that the admissions
program violated Title VI of the Federal Civil Rights Act, and they found it
unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. Id. at 421. Four other justices -
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun - addressed the constitutional
issue first because they were of the opinion that Title VI meant to bar only such
racial discrimination as was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. They
found that the school's program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
therefore it did not violate Title VI. As a result, Justice Powell's opinion cast the
deciding vote to invalidate the admissions program. Id. at 325. See infra notes
74-75 for a discussion of the various reasons for finding a Title VI violation.
72. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have
a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21, 24 (1979) (arguing that Bakke's precedential force
is governed by the common conclusions of Justices Powell and Stevens, though it
is erroneous to conclude that Powell's opinion has "controlling significance on all
questions"); But see, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A Constitutional Analysis,
67 CAL. L. REv. 69 (1979) (Justice Powell's "tiebreaking opinion... has acquired
wide pragmatic appeal.").
499
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Clause.7" Furthermore, he concluded that as a result of the con-
stitutional violation, the program also violated Title VI.74
Justice Powell found that the medical school's special admis-
sions program which was based solely on race, constituted a quota
system which was not narrowly tailored and failed strict scru-
tiny.75 He stated that, "[preferring members of any one group for
no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its
own sake."7 6 Programs which set aside a specific number of seats
for identified minority groups without comparing those groups
with other applicants, unfairly benefited the identified group at
the expense of other innocent individuals and violated the Equal
Protection Clause.7 7
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-284. Justice Powell agreed with Justice Brennan
and three other Justices that Title VI only barred discrimination that was
unconstitutional. Therefore, Justice Powell addressed the constitutional issue
first before deciding the Title VI issue. Nevertheless, Justice Powell sided with
Chief Justice Burger and three other Justices by finding that this particular
program violated Title VI. The five members of the Court that addressed the
constitutional issue found that the use of racial classifications in the special
admissions program required the program to be subjected to strict scrutiny to
determine its constitutional validity. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny
standard of review see discussion infra part III.C.
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-284. Justice Powell's reasoning for finding a Title
VI violation differed from the other four Justices in that his determination of a
Title VI violation came as a result of a prior determination that the program
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices
Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, found the program in violation of Title VI
without reaching the constitutional issue.
75. Id. at 315. Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny to determine
their constitutional validity, and a program must meet a two prong test to satisfy
strict scrutiny. serve both a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly
tailored to meet that interest. For a further discussion of the strict scrutiny test
see discussion infra part III.C. Justice Powell's opinion suggests that, even
assuming that educational diversity would conceivably be a compelling
governmental interest, the medical school's program was not narrowly tailored to
meet that interest, thus it failed the strict scrutiny test. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
76. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
77. Id. Racial classifications are subject to the strictest of scrutiny to
determine their constitutional validity, and a race-conscious program must meet
the following two prong test to satisfy strict scrutiny: (1) these programs must
both serve a compelling governmental interest and (2) be narrowly tailored to
meet that interest. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, §14-5. Justice Powell's
opinion suggests that, even assuming that educational diversity would
conceivably be a compelling governmental interest, the medical school's program
was not narrowly tailored to meet that interest, thus it failed the strict scrutiny
test. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. For a discussion of the "strict scrutiny" standard for
[Vol. 19:489500
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As an alternative to the medical school's special, race-based
quota system, Justice Powell approved of an admissions program
which used race as one of many factors to achieve a diverse stu-
dent body.7" Justice Powell wrote, "the attainment of a diverse
student body [is] a constitutionally permissible goal for an institu-
tion of higher education."' s Justice Powell concluded that educa-
tional excellence is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse
student body which contributes to a robust exchange of ideas,"
therefore, admissions programs using race as one factor among
others to achieve diversity would withstand constitutional
scrutiny.8 0
Under Justice Powell's recommended system, race or ethnic
background may be deemed a "plus factor" in a particular appli-
cant's file, yet the applicant's file would still be compared with
other applicants at some point in the admissions process.8 1
Although some may argue that discretionary programs could be a
subtle means of employing racial preference, Justice Powell found
that "good faith would be presumed" on behalf of an institution
implementing such a program. 2
Despite his proposal that race may be deemed a "plus factor"
in order to achieve diversity, Justice Powell's proposal did not pre-
cisely outline a procedure for the use of race among other fac-
tors. 3 Justice Powell neglected to provide a definition for
diversity which outlines the characteristics necessary for achiev-
sustaining constitutional validity and the narrowly tailored element of strict
scrutiny see discussion infra parts III.B. and III.C.
78. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
79. Id. at 311. Justice Powell found diversity to be a compelling
governmental interest that would satisfy strict scrutiny as long as the race-
conscious program was narrowly tailored. In addition, Justice Powell found that
although remedying the present effects of past discrimination constitutes a
compelling governmental interest, the medical school's special admissions
program did not serve to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. The
special admissions program was neither necessary to remedy societal or
institutional discrimination, nor was the program necessary to increase the
representation of minority physicians in community's that were underserved.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-311. For a discussion concerning the strict scrutiny
standard of review for race-conscious programs see discussion infra part III.B.
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. See also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring
Affirmative Action Admissions Policies With Federal Judicial Guidelines: A
Model for the Twenty-First Century, 22 J.C. & U. L. 895, 904 (1996).
81. Id. at 317.
82. Id. at 318.
83. Chin, supra note 64, at 890.
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ing diversity. ,Consequently, the opinion left educational institu-
tions without a guide to help design an admissions program using
race as a factor to achieve diversity.8 4
Two portions of Justice Powell's opinion were joined by four
other Justices: (1) the statement of facts, and (2) the paragraph
which stated that not all racial classifications were invalidated by
the Fourteenth Amendment.8 5 No other Justice joined in Justice
Powell's opinion that using race to achieve educational diversity,
in and of itself, would serve a compelling governmental interest
and meet constitutional scrutiny. Four Justices in a concurring
opinion did agree that an admissions program could use race as
one factor in achieving diversity so long as diversity is necessary
to remedy societal discrimination. 6 Therefore, these Justices did
not concur with Justice Powell's intimation that diversity, alone,
could constitute a compelling governmental interest.
Although Justice Powell found that using race as the deciding
factor in the medical school's admissions program by setting aside
allotted seats and failing to compare racially classified applicants
at any time during the process violated the Equal Protection
Clause, he proposed that the use of race in conjunction with other
factors to achieve diversity would survive constitutional scrutiny.
Therefore, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke made it appear that
the interest in educational diversity could support some use of
racial classifications and withstand constitutional scrutiny.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision to Subject All Race-conscious
Programs to Strict Scrutiny
At the heart of the debate concerning the constitutional valid-
ity of race-conscious admissions programs lies the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted and ratified in 1868, states in pertinent
part, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny
84. Id. at 883.
85. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-284.
86. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun were of the opinion
that even this dual track, race-conscious admission program did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, these Justices joined Justice Douglas in the
intimation that a program could use race in conjunction with other factors to
achieve diversity. However, these Justices conditioned the use of race to achieve
diversity upon the necessity for remedying the present effects of past
discrimination.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
502 [Vol. 19:489
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to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."8 8 The constitutional validity of'such programs ultimately
rests in the resolution of whether the use of race alone, or in con-
junction with other factors, in admissions programs violates the
Equal Protection Clause.
Over 100 years have passed since Justice Harlan, "in a lonely
dissent, observed 'lolur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens.'"8 9 Recent
Supreme Court decisions have seemingly acknowledged Justice
Harlan's words by establishing a significant trend toward elimi-
nating programs involving racial classifications in areas outside
the realm of higher education.
In its last term, the Supreme Court invalidated race-con-
scious programs which sought to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination, 90 to create congressional districts,91 and to award
federal contracts.92 The Court's current position of restricting
race-conscious programs will undoubtedly influence determina-
tions of the validity of these programs in higher education.
The recent eradication of race-conscious programs outside the
realm of higher education results from the Supreme Court's 1989
decision in Richmond v. J.A Croson Co. 93 Croson firmly estab-
lished that the appropriate standard of review for race-conscious
programs should be strict or heightened scrutiny.94 In Croson, a
bidder challenged the plan of the City of Richmond which required
prime contractors, who were awarded city contracts, to subcon-
88. Id.
89. William E. Thro, The Constitutional Problem of Race-Based Scholarships
and a Practical Solution, 111 ED. LAw. REP. 625 (October 1996) (quoting Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
90. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2043, 2050-55 (1995 district
court's order to increase salaries and inter-district funding of quality education
programs to attract transfer students of a different race from outside school
district were beyond remedial powers of the Court).
91. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (Georgia's 1992
congressional redistricting plan, which used race as the "predominant,
overriding factor" was constitutionally invalid). See also Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993) (the creation of irregularly shaped majority African-American
voting districts in North Carolina was presumptively unconstitutional).
92. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) ( federal programs designed to
provide highway contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises were
presumptively unconstitutional).
93. 488 U.S. 469.
94. Id. For a discussion concerning the strict scrutiny standard for reviewing
constitutionally validity see discussion infra parts III.B., III.C.
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tract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to "Minor-
ity Business Enterprises."95 The Court decided that the city's
plan must be subjected to strict scrutiny for constitutional validity
and found that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. 6
In Croson, a majority of the Court agreed that all state and local
government programs involving racial classifications must be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny to satisfy constitutionally validity.9 7
In 1995, the Court reaffirmed the Croson decision to subject
programs involving racial classifications to strict scrutiny in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.9 s The Court in Adarand
extended the strict scrutiny standard of review to race-conscious
programs implemented by the Federal Government.99 The Court
found that, "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny." ° °
In Adarand, a subcontractor initiated a suit after the Depart-
ment of Transportation awarded a construction contract to a
minority-owned company despite the fact that Adarand submitted
95. Id.
96. Id. Croson found that the strict scrutiny standard of review for race-
conscious programs under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification. Id. at 483.
97. Id.; see Cosner, supra note 90, at 1004. See also the following plurality
decisions suggesting racial classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny for
reviewing their constitutional validity: United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
(1987) (addressing the use of racial quotas as a remedial measure); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (addressing race-based preferences in
a faculty lay-off proceeding); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986)
(addressing use of race in an appointment of an administrator as a remedial
measure); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (addressing racial set-
asides in federal laws); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (addressing race-conscious
programs in higher education).
98. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097.
99. Id. In 1990, the Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547
(1990) declined to subject a Congressionally mandated program which utilized
racial classifications to strict scrutiny, and instead used an "intermediate
scrutiny" standard of review. See infra p. 24 and note 133. Although Croson
definitively set forth the strict scrutiny test for state and local government race-
conscious programs, uncertainty still existed, in light of Metro, as to the
appropriate standard of review for federally approved race-conscious programs.
The Court in Adarand laid the uncertainty to rest by all race-conscious
programs will be subjected the strictest of scrutiny.
100. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Alter Croson and Adarand all racial
classifications, even race-conscious programs enacted to aid the traditionally
underprivileged races, are subject to strict scrutiny.
504 [Vol. 19:489
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the lowest bid. '0 ' Adarand challenged a federal program designed
to provide highway contracts to disadvantaged business enter-
prises.102 The Court stated that, because racial classifications so
seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment, and
because classifications based on race are potentially so harmful to
the entire body politic, it is especially important that the reasons
for any such classification be clearly identified and unquestionably
legitimate .. . racial classifications are simply too pernicious to
permit any but the most exact connection between justification
and classification.10 3
Current Supreme Court Equal Protection jurisprudence views
all racial classifications as inherently suspect and subjects them to
strict scrutiny. Therefore, the constitutional validity of race-con-
scious admissions programs in higher education must be subjected
to strict scrutiny.
C. Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review for Constitutional
Validity
Race-conscious programs subjected to strict scrutiny must ful-
fill a rigorous two-prong test. 0 4 In order for a program involving
racial classification to satisfy strict scrutiny, courts require enti-
ties to demonstrate that the program both: (1) serves a compelling
governmental interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to meet that
interest. 0 5 Programs subjected to strict scrutiny have difficulty
meeting both prongs of the test.
101. Id.
102. Id. The Small Business Administration Act declares it to be "the policy of
the United States that small business concerns, [and] small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals...
shall have the maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the
performance of contracts let by any Federal Agency." 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(1). The
Act defines "socially disadvantaged individuals" as "those who have been
subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as
a member of a group without regard to their qualities." 15 U.S.C. §637(a)(5).
103. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutzniick, 448 U.S. at
533-535, 537 (1980)).
104. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, §14.3, at 602. See also Adarand, 115
S. Ct. at 2113.
105. Id. Note the contrast between strict scrutiny and the two lower standards
of review for constitutional validity. The "rational relation" test only requires a
showing that "it is conceivable that the classification bears a rational
relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the
Constitution." Id. at 601. The "intermediate scrutiny" test only requires a
showing that "the classifications has a 'substantial relationship' to an 'important'
505
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1. The Difficulty in Finding a Compelling Governmental
Interest For Racial Classifications
The first prong of the strict scrutiny standard of review
requires that admissions programs which use racial classifications
serve a compelling governmental interest, such as remedying the
present effects of past discrimination or promoting diversity. The
Supreme Court has only recognized remedial efforts as compelling
governmental interest for programs involving racial classifica-
tions.10 6 The Court, however, has made it difficult for race-con-
scious programs initiated to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination to survive the strict scrutiny test.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, non-minority
school teachers challenged the validity of a race-conscious layoff
plan encompassed in a collective bargaining agreement between a
school board and a teacher's union.10 7 The Supreme Court, in a
plurality opinion written by Justice Powell, addressed whether
the plan provided a remedy for the present effects of past discrimi-
nation such that it would serve a compelling governmental inter-
est.'0 8 The Court stated that, "societal discrimination alone is
[not] sufficient to justify a racial classification." 10 9 "Societal dis-
crimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing
a racially classified remedy."110
The Wygant Court "insisted upon some showing of prior dis-
crimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing the
use of racial classifications to remedy such discrimination.""'
The Court required "convincing" or "sufficient" evidence to show
that the governmental unit discriminated in the past and that the
present remedial action is warranted. 1 2 Applying the Wygant
Court's finding to the educational arena requires institutions to
show that either their specific educational institution or their
school system discriminated in the past in order for a remedial
government interest." Id. at 603. Both the rational relation and intermediate
scrutiny test grant considerably more deference to federal and state legislatures
in utilizing classifications of people.
106. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280.
107. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 276.
111. Id. at 274. The plurality decision in Wygant was reaffirmed by a majority
of the Supreme Court in Croson. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488.
112. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
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admissions program to serve a compelling governmental
interest. 11 3
The decision in Wygant erects an obstacle for race-conscious
programs which attempt to remedy past discrimination. These
institutions often fail to show the nexus between their specific
educational institution or school system's past discriminatory
practices and the resulting present effects. 114 Without this nexus,
educational institutions fail to justify the use of race in their
admissions programs on the basis of remedying the effects of past
discrimination.
Diversity provides an important interest for race-conscious
admissions programs. Notwithstanding Justice Powell's opinion,
a majority of the Court has yet to hold that racial classifications
used to achieve diversity may serve a compelling governmental
interest in the educational arena. 1 15 However, the Court in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C. did address the use of preferential
racial classifications to achieve diversity outside the educational
arena. 116
In Metro, the Court determined the constitutional validity of
two Federal Communication Commission measures that favored
racial minorities when issuing broadcast licenses. 11 7 The Com-
mission's policies were designed to increase broadcast diversity. "18
Despite the holding in Croson one year earlier that racial classifi-
cations for state and local governments must be subjected to strict
scrutiny, a majority of the Court in Metro held that because the
racial classification involved a Federally operated race-conscious
program, the appropriate standard of review was intermediate
scrutiny." 9 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the classification
have a "substantial relationship" to an "important" government
interest, whereas strict scrutiny requires a "compelling" govern-
113. For a discussion of the remedial interest's application to a school's
scholarship program see infra part III.D.
114. Id.
115. Recall, that four Justices in Bakke held that diversity constitutes a
compelling governmental interest, however, they found that the use of race to
achieve diversity must be necessary to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. Therefore, those four Justices did not agree with Justice Powell
that diversity alone would constitute a compelling governmental interest. See
supra note 87.
116. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 576.
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mental interest and a program which is "narrowly tailored" to
meet that interest. 120 As a result of being subjected to a lesser
than strict scrutiny standard of review, the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the racial classification. The Court found that
diversity was an "important" governmental interest to which the
Federal Communication Commission's policies were substantially
related. 121
The following year, the Court in Adarand specifically over-
ruled the Metro's application of the intermediate scrutiny test to
programs involving racial classification. However, the Court did
not address the diversity issue in Adarand.122 Because Metro
failed to use the strict scrutiny test, the Court found diversity to
be an important, not compelling, governmental interest. 123 There-
fore, a majority of the Court has yet to find that diversity consti-
tutes a compelling governmental interest which would satisfy
strict scrutiny.
The possibility of diversity serving as a compelling govern-
mental interest will remain until the Supreme Court emphatically
rejects such rationale. Therefore, any analysis of whether admis-
sions programs using racial classifications serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest should include a determination as to whether
the program serves as a remedy for the present effect of past dis-
crimination or possibly achieves diversity.
2. The Difficulty in Narrowly Tailoring a Program Involving
Racial Classifications
When an entity's use of racial classifications serves a compel-
ling governmental interest, the classification must be narrowly
tailored in accomplishing the compelling governmental inter-
est. 124 The narrowly tailored requirement "ensures that the
means chosen fit this compelling goal so closely that there is little
or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegiti-
mate racial prejudice or stereotype." 125 Race-conscious programs
may be invalidated for lack of narrow tailoring if they provide ben-
120. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, §14.3, at 603 (5th ed. 1995). For a
discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review see infra part III.C.
121. Metro, 497 U.S. 547.
122. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2097.
123. Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons and
Directions from the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1006 (1996).
124. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, §14.3, at 602 (5th ed. 1995).
125. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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efits for individuals who do not represent the subjects for which
the compelling governmental interest was found.
In 1987, the Court in United States v. Paradise articulated
the narrowly tailored element of strict scrutiny while addressing a
district court order that required a racial quota promotion pro-
gram be put in the workplace. 126 The Court in Paradise unani-
mously concluded that the appropriate factors to consider in
determining whether a race-conscious program was narrowly tai-
lored included: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of
alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief;
(3) the relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant
labor market; and (4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third
parties. 127 After the Court found the district court's order demon-
strated a compelling governmental interest by remedying the
present effects of past discrimination by the governmental actor,
the Court applied these four factors and found that the program
was also narrowly tailored. 128
The Court's holding in Paradise provided evidence that a
race-conscious program could survive strict scrutiny. Paradise
shows that recent decisions by the Court in Croson and Adarand,
which subjected all programs involving racial classifications to
strict scrutiny, do not render such programs unconstitutional per
se. To the contrary, the Court in Adarand specifically "wish[ed] to
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact.'" 1 2 9 In practice, however, subjecting a race-conscious pro-
gram to strict scrutiny almost always renders the program
unconstitutional. 130
D. The Fourth Circuit Invalidates a University's Race-Based
Scholarship Program
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated
the difficulty that race-conscious programs have in passing a strict
scrutiny analysis. In Podberesky v. Kirwan, the court applied the
126. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). Paradise involved a district court order that required
the promotion of one African-American for every white person promoted. The
district court order came as a result of a finding that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety had systematically excluded African-Americans from employment
or promotion. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 186.
129. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118.
130. NowAK & RoTuNA, supra note 12, §14.5, at 637.
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strict scrutiny test to a merit-based scholarship program for Afri-
can-American students attending the University of Maryland. 13 1
The plaintiff, Daniel Podberesky, a Hispanic-American student,
claimed that he was denied equal protection under the law by
being excluded from consideration for the race-based scholarship
program.'3 2 The University argued that the race-based scholar-
ship program served a compelling governmental interest by
attempting to remedy the present effects of past discrimination.13 3
The district court sustained the University's argument that
the scholarship program served a compelling governmental inter-
est after finding a long history of pervasive discrimination by the
University against African-Americans resulted in four present
effects of past discrimination: (1) the University's poor reputation
in the African-American; (2) the present perception of a hostile
campus climate for African-American; (3) under-representation of
African-Americans in the student body; and (4) a disproportion-
ately high attrition rate among African-American students.13 4
The district court also found that the program was narrowly tai-
lored to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 13 5
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
erred in concluding that the present effects of past discrimination
existed.13 6 The court in Podberesky stated that "[tlo have a pres-
ent effect of past discrimination sufficient to justify the [race-con-
scious remedial] program [under the Equal Protection Clause], the
party seeking to implement the program must, at a minimum,
prove that the effect it proffers is caused by past discrimination
and that the effect is of sufficient magnitude to justify the pro-
gram."137 The court rejected the notion that the "poor reputation
in the black community" could support the race-based scholarship
program. 138
While the record demonstrated that the University had discrimi-
nated in the past, the University failed to establish the nexus
131. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 147.
132. Id. Daniel Podberesky was a Hispanic/white student, thus, he would
normally be classified as a minority. However, African-Americans were the
specific minority targeted for the scholarship benefits, therefore, he was not a
minority for the purposes of qualifying for the scholarship benefits.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 152.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 153.
138. Id. at 154.
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between those discriminatory practices and any present effects of
that discrimination that may be remedied by the use of the race-
based program.'" 9 The court found that "mere knowledge of his-
torical fact is not the kind of present effect that can justify a race-
exclusive remedy. If it were otherwise, as long as there are people
who have access to history books, there will be programs such as
this."140 Even if the University has a bad reputation in the minor-
ity community,
"the case against race-based programs does not rest on the sterile
assumption that American society is untouched or unaffected by
the tragic oppression of the past. [Ilt is the very enormity of that
tragedy that lends resolve to the desire to never repeat it, and find
a legal order in which distinctions based on race shall have no
place.
" 1 4 1
The Fourth Circuit found that the "hostile climate," "under-
representation," and the "attrition rate," were present effects of
past discrimination that would meet the compelling governmental
interest requirement of strict scrutiny. 14 2 However, the Univer-
sity failed to show the necessary nexus between these present
effects of discrimination and the past discrimination by the Uni-
versity.143 Therefore, the compelling governmental interest prong
of strict scrutiny was not satisfied."'
Even assuming that the University had proven the necessary
nexus between the acknowledged present effects of discrimination
and its own past discrimination, the court found that the scholar-
ship program was not narrowly tailored to meet the purported
compelling governmental interest. 45 The race-conscious program
only offered scholarships to high-achievers." 46 The court found
that by limiting the scholarships to high-achieving African-Ameri-
cans, the program was not sufficiently tailored to meet the
problems of the "hostile climate," "under-representation," and the
"attrition rate"147 "High-achievers, whether African-American or
not, are not the group against which the University discriminated
139. Id. at 154-55.
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1079 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
142. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 156.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 158.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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in the past."148 Thus, the court concluded that the program failed
the narrowly tailored prong of strict scrutiny.
Even though higher educational institutions have tradition-
ally implemented scholarships involving racial classifications as a
matter of course, this practice will not continue in the Fourth Cir-
cuit. The holding in Podberesky displays the difficulty which race-
conscious remedial programs encounter when constitutionally
challenged and subjected to strict scrutiny.
The law surrounding race-conscious programs in higher edu-
cation remains in an uncertain state. The courts have told schools
that race-conscious programs serve a compelling interest when
remedying past discrimination, yet the courts have not defined the
nexus requirements. The courts have also stated that diversity
may serve a compelling interest, yet in the educational context,
the Court has given nothing more firm than the confusing plural-
ity in Bakke as guidance.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The University's Admissions Program Fails to Serve a
Compelling Governmental Interest.
1. Hopwood Refused to recognize Justice Powell's
Educational Diversity As a Compelling Governmental
Interest.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood acknowledged
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for racial
classifications and began its analysis by applying strict scrutiny to
the school's admissions program. 149 The court in Hopwood ini-
tially reviewed the district court's finding that using race as an
admissions factor achieved educational diversity which served a
compelling governmental interests. 50 The court acknowledged
that Justice Powell's separate opinion in Bakke provided the
impetus for recognizing diversity as a compelling governmental
interest in higher education.' 5 ' Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke and its signifi-
cance to the issue presented in Hopwood.152
148. Id.
149. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 941-947.
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The court stated that Justice Powell intimated that a school
could use race among other factors in an admissions process.' 53
Hopwood reviewed Justice Powell's belief that diversity in educa-
tion serves a compelling governmental interest and sufficiently
justifies the use of racial classifications.15 4 The court also recog-
nized that Justice Powell's opinion precluded schools from refus-
ing to compare applicants of different races during the admissions
process or establishing a race-based quota system.15 5
The Fifth Circuit, however, emphasized that the Court in
Bakke failed to reach a consensus with six Justices filing separate
opinions, none of which received more than four votes.' 5 6 The
court in Hopwood pointed out that Justice Powell's opinion, that
educational diversity would serve a compelling governmental
interest, "garnered only his own vote and has never represented
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case."' 5
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit declared that "Justice Powell's view in
Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue."158
The court then recited Supreme Court precedent and noted
that no case since Bakke has stated that diversity alone may serve
as a compelling governmental interest under strict scrutiny.15 9
Hopwood stated, "The [Supreme] Court appears to have decided
that there is essentially only one compelling governmental inter-
est to justify racial classification: remedying past wrongs."' 6 °
Given this, the court in Hopwood addressed the issue of whether
race may be used to achieve educational diversity and serve a
compelling governmental interest.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion expressed that "within the general
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment, the use of race in admis-
sions for diversity in higher education contradicts, rather than
furthers, the aims of equal protection. It treats minorities as a
group, rather than as individuals."' 6 1 Therefore, the court
required additional justifications for using race in admissions and
153. Id. at 943.
154. Id. at 942-43.
155. Id. at 943-44.
156. Id. at 941. See supra note 71.
157. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 945.
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found that educational diversity did not serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 16 2
In finding that using race to achieve educational diversity did
not serve a compelling governmental interest, the court reasoned
that race is not synonymous with diversity. "The use of race, in
and of itself, to choose students simply achieves a student body
that looks different. Such a criterion is no more rational on its
own terms than would be choices based upon the physical size or
blood type of applicants."' 63 The court proposed that diversity
may be achieved by a host of factors that may be correlated with
race.164 These factors include: musical talent, athletic ability, aca-
demic achievement, and geographic residence. 16 5
Other factors, which may be correlated to race, may also serve
to achieve diversity such as the economic or educational back-
ground of one's parents. 166 However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the
idea that race should serve as a proxy for diversity. 167 The court
found that using race as a proxy for diversity fostered stereotyping
individuals. 168 The court stated that "the assumption is that a
certain individual possesses characteristics by virtue of being a
member of a certain racial group."169 Furthermore, "the use of a
racial characteristic to establish a presumption that the individ-
ual also possesses other, and socially relevant, characteristics,
exemplifies, encourages, and legitimizes the mode of thought and
behavior that underlies most prejudice and bigotry in modern
America."170
In concluding its analysis of the diversity interest, the court
in Hopwood held that using race to achieve diversity in admis-
sions would never serve a compelling governmental interest. 171 In
so holding, Hopwood created new law and became the first court
to declare the death of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, at least
in the Fifth Circuit.
162. Id. at 945-46.
163. Id. at 945.
164. Id. at 946.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 946 n.31.
167. Id. at 946.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the
Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT.
REv. 12 (1974)).
171. Id. at 947.
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2. Hopwood Relied Extensively Upon Podberesky and Found
That The Law School's Admissions Program Was Not
Remedying the Present Effects of Past Discrimination.
The court in Hopwood next addressed the district court's
determination that the remedial purpose of the law school's pro-
gram served a compelling governmental interest. 172 Since the
Supreme Court in Wygant held that to remedy the present effects
of past discrimination there must be some showing of prior dis-
crimination by the particular government unit involved, the court
needed to determine the appropriate government entity. The
court identified the law school, as opposed to the entire Texas
school system, as the relevant alleged past discriminator. 173
Prior discrimination existed at the University of Texas Law
School. The Supreme Court in Sweatt v. Painter,174 struck down
the law school's proposed "separate but equal" format for discrimi-
nation which violated of the Equal Protection Clause. However,
the district court found that such prior discrimination ended in
the 1960's. 171
In determining whether the remedial purpose of the law
school's admissions program served a compelling governmental
interest, the Fifth Circuit relied extensively on the Fourth Cir-
cuit's ruling in Podberesky v. Kirwan. In Podberesky, the Fourth
Circuit held that in order to have a present effect of past discrimi-
nation which sufficiently justifies a race-conscious educational
program, the party seeking to validate the program must prove
that the present discriminatory effect is caused by past discrimi-
nation and is of sufficient magnitude to justify the program. 176
Therefore, the court in Hopwood reviewed the district court's find-
ing that present effects of past discrimination existed.
The district court in Hopwood found the following to be pres-
ent effects of past discrimination: (1) the law school's lingering
reputation in the minority community; (2) the under-representa-
tion of minorities in the student body; and (3) the perception that
the law school is a hostile environment for. 177 In addressing these
proffered effects of past discrimination, the Court of Appeals for
172. Id. at 948.
173. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952.
174. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
175. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953 (citing Hopwood, 861 F.Supp. at 555).
176. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153.
177. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952.
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the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "the Fourth Circuit examined
similar arguments in Podberesky."17 8
Upon reviewing the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Podberesky,
the court in Hopwood concluded that the law school's "lingering
reputation" did not represent present effects of past discrimina-
tion. The Fifth Circuit held, as did Podberesky in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, that any poor reputation of the law school is tied to
knowledge of historical discrimination and not present effects of
discrimination.17 9
The court next addressed the "under-representation" argu-
ment. The law school claimed that discrimination by the State of
Texas educational system had a direct present effect on the educa-
tional attainment of the targeted minorities.1 8 0 However, as pre-
viously mentioned, the court found the law school to be the
appropriate governmental unit from which the present effects of
past discrimination must be shown.' 8 '
The Fifth Circuit did not find that a "sufficient" showing
existed between past discrimination by the law school and the
present under-representation of minority applicants.18 2 The court
also noted that even had the entire Texas school system been iden-
tified as the appropriate governmental unit which discriminated
in the past, the necessary relationship between the past discrimi-
nation and the present effects would still be lacking. Only
"grossly speculative" evidence existed to show that the present
"under-representation" resulted from past discrimination by the
state's school system.' In addition, the present "hostile environ-
ment lacked the necessary nexus with the law school's past dis-
crimination because the "hostile environment" was found to be a
result of societal discrimination.18 4
The court in Hopwood found that the law school failed to
show that the admissions program served a compelling govern-
mental interest by attempting to remedy the present effects of
past discrimination. 8 5 As a result of finding that both of the law
school's purported governmental interests failed to survive strict
178. Id.
179. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-955.
180. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
181. Id. at 952.
182. Id.
183. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955.
184. Id. at 953.
185. Id. at 955.
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scrutiny, the court held that the admissions program violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The court ordered the law school to
allow the plaintiffs to reapply under a constitutionally valid
admissions system and remanded to the district court to recon-
sider the question of damages. 186
B. "We judge best when we judge least, particularly in
controversial matters of high public interest."8 7
1. Hopwood "Was Overly Broad and Unnecessary to the
Disposition of the Case."188
In a written concurring opinion, Judge Wiener of the three
judge panel expressed concern that the court in Hopwood improp-
erly analyzed the case. Therefore, Judge Wiener concluded that
the majority's decision "was overly broad and unnecessary to the
disposition of the case." 18 9 Judge Wiener stated, "we judge best
when we judge least, particularly in controversial matters of high
public interest ... We should decide only the case before us, and
should do so on the narrowest possible basis."190
Judge Wiener's concurring opinion briefly affirmed the major-
ity panel's holding that the law school failed to demonstrate the
present effects of past discrimination sufficient to justify the use of
racial classification. 191 Judge Wiener then addressed the major-
ity's ruling that race could never be used to achieve diversity in
education because diversity did not serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. 192 Judge Wiener declared that the majority
panel unnecessarily discussed the issue of educational diversity
serving a compelling governmental interest. 193
For the purpose of his opinion, Judge Wiener assumed that
Justice Powell's proposed educational diversity did serve a com-
pelling governmental interest.19 4 However, Judge Wiener demon-
strated that the majority panel could have reviewed the
186. Id. at 962. The court in Hopwood discussed issues concerning the proper
damages which should be awarded and whether proposed intervenors were
properly denied intervention. Both issues are beyond the scope of this note.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 963.
189. Id. at 962.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 962, 964-965.
193. Id. at 962.
194. Id.
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admissions program by determining whether the program was
narrowly tailored. 195 In so doing, he concluded that the majority
panel would have found the program lacked the narrow tailoring
necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny. 19 6 Judge Wiener's analysis:
Focusing as it does on blacks and Mexican-Americans only, the
law school's 1992 admissions process misconceived the concept of
diversity ... Diversity which furthers a compelling [governmental]
interest 'encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial and ethnic origin is but a single
though important element... ,197
. . . Blacks and Mexican-Americans are but two among any
number of racial or ethnic groups that could and presumably
should contribute to genuine diversity ....
... In this light, the limited racial effects of the law school's prefer-
ential admissions process, targeting exclusively blacks and Mexi-
can-Americans, more closely resembles a set aside or quota system
for those two disadvantaged minorities than it does an academic
admissions program narrowly tailored to achieve true diversity. I
concede that the law school's 1992 admissions process would
increase the percentages of black faces and brown faces in that
year's entering class. But facial diversity is not true diversity, and
a system thus conceived and implemented simply is not narrowly
tailored to achieve diversity.' 9 '
As Judge Wiener pointed out, Justice Powell in Bakke stated that
diversity which furthers a compelling governmental interest
"encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and character-
istics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though impor-
tant element."199 As a result, Justice Powell refused to accept an
admission program such as the one in place in Hopwood that used
race as the sole factor in determining diversity.200
In Bakke, a majority of the Court agreed that a university's
admissions program that favored minority groups and never com-
pared them with other individual applicants violated the Equal
195. Id. at 965-966.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 965 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316).
198. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965-966.
199. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
200. Id.
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Protection Clause.2° ' Such was the case with the law school in
Hopwood, as the school failed to compare African-Americans and
Mexican-Americans with the remainder of the applicant pool dur-
ing the admissions process.2 °2 In this regard, the admissions pro-
gram was analogous to the admissions program invalidated by
Bakke.
The Court in Bakke would likely have invalidated the admis-
sions program at issue in Hopwood by using the same analysis the
Court used in Bakke. Acknowledging this, Judge Wiener con-
cluded that the majority panel's decision was overreaching in
unnecessarily declaring the death of Justice Powell's educational
diversity.20 3
However, the decision in Hopwood which forbade racial clas-
sifications to achieve educational diversity constituted a defensi-
ble extension of recent Supreme Court precedent. Judge Wiener
acknowledged that a bright-line rule proscribing any use of race
as a determinate in admissions programs may have a simplifying
appeal which may in time become the position of the Supreme
Court.2 °4 Despite this, Judge Wiener concluded that such a time
has not arrived for the Supreme Court to make such a
declaration.2 °5
2. Hopwood Violates the Judiciary Principle that
Constitutional Issues Should Be Reached Only if
Necessary.
Judge Wiener's concurring opinion identified the analysis the
court in Hopwood should have followed. In analyzing racial diver-
sity, the court violated the well-recognized principle that constitu-
tional issues should be reached only when necessary. °6 The
Supreme Court has stated that "it is a fundamental rule of judicial
restraint . . .that this Court will not reach constitutional ques-
tions in advance of the necessity of deciding them. 0
This rule of judicial restraint is well-recognized in the Fifth
Circuit. The majority author of Hopwood, Judge Jerry Smith,
201. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
203. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 963.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, §1.4, at 7.
207. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 172, 224 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)).
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acknowledged this rule in writing a Fifth Circuit opinion in Wil-
kerson v. Whitley. 20 The court in Hopwood should have recog-
nized this rule of judicial restraint and reserved the Supreme
Court the right to determine whether diversity could ever serve a
compelling governmental interest.
C. The Effects of Hopwood on the Current Judicial Climate
Concerning the Role of Race in Admissions.
1. Race-conscious Admissions Programs Have Difficulty
Surviving Strict Scrutiny and Equal Protection Review.
The decision in Hopwood reveals the current dilemma educa-
tional institutions face in seeking to maintain their practice of
using race in admissions programs. The decision, consistent with
Wygant, portrays the difficulty in using race as a remedy to past
discrimination. The decision also articulates the argument that
any use of race to achieve educational diversity would fail to serve
a compelling governmental interest because race is not synony-
mous with diversity. Although the majority's opinion was over-
reaching, the proper analysis utilized by Judge Wiener's
concurrence rendered the same outcome by finding that the pro-
gram violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The state of the law concerning race-conscious programs cre-
ates problems for educational institutions which desire to con-
tinue using race as a factor in their admissions programs. In an
initial response to the question of whether race should be used as
a factor in admissions, individuals often recite the necessity of
reversing the present effects of past societal discrimination. Many
Americans find it unacceptable that the American judicial system
can admit that the Constitution was violated for over a century
through unjust treatment of African-Americans, while at the same
time subjecting proposed remedies to strict scrutiny. Using race
to remedy historical discrimination places institutions in the
unenviable position of showing that discrimination by that partic-
ular institution or school system caused the present effects.
Standard 212 of the American Bar Association Standards for
the Accreditation of Law Schools vividly illustrates this dilemma
in the admissions programs of law schools.2 °9 Standard 212 dis-
208. Chin, supra note 64, at 945 (citing 28 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 740 (1995)).
209. Chin, supra note 64, at 907 (citing Approval of Law Schools: American
Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure §212 (1980)).
[Vol. 19:489520
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cusses established race-conscious policies concerning admissions
requirements for law schools.21 ° Standard 212 requires all law
schools to have race-conscious policies for "qualified members of
groups (notably racial and ethnic minorities) which have been vic-
tims of discrimination in various forms."21
Standard 212 is concerned explicitly with addressing histori-
cal discrimination.21 2 However, if the implementation of this pol-
icy results in the admission of applicants who would otherwise
have been rejected, compliance with Standard 212 likely would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. The school would not be act-
ing to overcome its own history of discrimination as required by
Wygant. Even this "model" admissions program for accredited law
schools seems to invite schools to implement race-conscious pro-
grams while ignoring the constraints set down by Wygant. 21'
Because educational institutions have difficulty proving that
the present effects of discrimination are a result of their own or
their school system's prior discrimination, the institutions are rel-
egated to arguing that the use of race is necessary to achieve
diversity.2 14 As shown by the analysis in Hopwood, race may not
necessarily be equated with diversity. Despite its overly broad
holding, the case demonstrates the persuasive argument that race
is not synonymous with diversity and should not be used as a
proxy for diversity.
The court in Hopwood argued that using racial classifications
in admissions programs results in nothing more than stereotyping
of individuals based solely on the color of their skin. Even Justice
Douglas, the proponent of educational diversity, in another often-
cited opinion, stated:
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. . if
discrimination based on race is constitutionally permissible when
those holding the reins can come up with "compelling" reasons to
justify it, then constitutional guarantees acquire an accordion-like
quality.2 15
The viewpoint that race should not be a proxy for diversity
appeals to many. As a result, Hopwood's bright-line rule prohibit-
ing the use of race to achieve diversity admissions programs could
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Chin, supra note 64, at 887.
215. De Funis v. Odegaarde, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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be adopted by other circuits. Even if other circuits do not adopt
the Fifth Circuit's prohibition of diversity serving a compelling
governmental interest, race-conscious admissions programs would
still have difficulty overcoming strict scrutiny. In the event that a
court would hold that race contributes to diversity, which in turn
serves a compelling governmental interest, Judge Wiener's con-
curring opinion demonstrates the difficulty in satisfying the nar-
rowly tailored requirement of strict scrutiny.216
The implicit assumptions of race-conscious admissions pro-
grams appear to result in such programs failing the narrowly tai-
lored prong of strict scrutiny. Institutions often seek to assist
students that are disadvantaged. Because a disproportionate
number of racial minorities seemingly fit within the disadvan-
taged category, institutions use race to determine who will benefit
from the preferential admissions treatment.217 By operating race-
conscious admissions programs, institutions implicitly assume
that all members of certain racial minorities are disadvantaged.
As a result, these admissions programs are over-inclusive in that
they include certain racial minorities who may not be
disadvantaged.
Further, by offering preferential admissions treatment to only
certain races, race-conscious admissions programs implicitly
assume that the only disadvantaged people are those who belong
to the particular race that is receiving the benefit of the preferen-
tial treatment.2 1 8  In so doing, race-conscious admissions pro-
grams eliminate potentially disadvantaged applicants who may
not be a member of the race designated to receive preferential
treatment. In this regard, these programs are under-inclusive.
The implicit assumptions of race-conscious admissions programs
lead to both over-inclusive and under-inclusive preferential treat-
216. For a comprehensive analysis of the potential ways to make an
admissions program narrowly see Chin, supra note 64, at 891. Chin suggests
that culturally diverse programs are capable of being narrowly tailored. The
article analyzes the four potential ways of narrowly tailoring a program seeking
to achieve diversity and finds that these four ideas are incapable of being
narrowly tailored: (1) using the proportion to the population; (2) maximizing
cultural diversity; (3) using cultural selectivity; and (4) maximizing racial
diversity. Id. But see orig. Garfield, supra note 80. Garfield proposes a model
admissions program which utilizes race as a factor in admissions and argues that
the proposed program would satisfy strict scrutiny.
217. Thro, supra note 89, at 627.
218. Id.
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ment, causing these programs to fail the narrowly tailored prong
of strict scrutiny.
An application of the holding in United States v. Paradise also
reveals that race-conscious programs likely fail the narrowly tai-
lored requirement. 219 First, it would seem possible to remedy past
discrimination or achieve a diverse student body without using
race in the admissions process. 22 0 Second, most of these admis-
sions programs are intended to last indefinitely and lack a clear
termination point.2 2 1 Third, the numerical goals of the institu-
tions lack the necessary relationship to the relevant labor mar-
ket.2 2 2 Fourth, these admission programs disqualify other
races.2 23 Therefore, even if diversity could serve as a compelling
governmental interest that would justify race-conscious programs,
such programs would seemingly lack the necessary requirements
to be narrowly tailored.
2. Educational Institutions Should Pursue Alternative Race-
Neutral Factors In Light of Current Equal Protection
Jurisprudence.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood and other recent
Supreme Court cases show that the judiciary has made it difficult
for admissions programs to use racial classifications. Educational
institutions which insist on assisting disadvantaged applicants
should look to alternative race-neutral admissions policies that
serve the same purpose as race. These alternatives would provide
disadvantaged applicants access to education without regard to
their race. These factors include: (1) the socioeconomic status of
the applicant; (2) educational background of the applicant's fam-
ily; (3) the degree to which the government has supported the fam-
ily in the past; (4) the geographical area in which the applicant
resides; (5) ranking of the primary and secondary educational
institutions by historical standardized test score averages; and (6)
utilizing open-ended questions on applications such as "describe
any obstacles you have had to overcome in your lifetime."2 2'
219. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
220. Thro, supra note 89, at 627.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Any one of these factors alone would not achieve either diversity or allow
an opportunity to one who may have been underprivileged in the past.
Socioeconomic status would not serve as a proper indicator because the
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A high correlation between these proposed alternative factors
and certain racial minorities should inevitably result.225 How-
ever, the admissions process would not include or exclude poten-
tial candidates on the basis of their race.226 There may be some
white applicants which fall into the disadvantaged category and
some African-American applicants who would not fall into such a
category.227
By shifting the focus of institutional admissions programs
from race to disadvantaged status, the institutions would assist
disadvantaged people, regardless of their race, to obtain the bene-
fits of acquiring an education.228 At the same time, these institu-
tions would alleviate any Equal Protection concerns.229 In light of
the judiciary's recent trend of eradication of race-conscious pro-
grams, institutions should consider these alternatives in order to
operate admissions programs that do not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Hopwood found that the use of race in admis-
sions programs to achieve diversity could never serve a compelling
governmental interest that would survive strict scrutiny. Fur-
ther, the court demonstrated the difficulty that admissions pro-
grams when using race to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination have accomplishing a compelling governmental
interest. The court in Hopwood, for all practical purposes, elimi-
nated the use of race as a factor in admissions programs within
the Fifth Circuit.
Although the majority's decision overstated the death of Jus-
tice Powell's opinion concerning educational diversity, the Fifth
Circuit's argument is provocative. The use of race to symbolize
demographics of the population show numerous white applicants of low
socioeconomic status for every comparative African-American person. Thus, the
white applicants would receive the benefits of such a system because there are
simply more white applicants applying. A composite of these factors, however,
may produce a similar result as the use of race in admissions programs without
the stereotypical effects that race equals diversity. For an in-depth look at a
proposed model of an admissions program, see Garfield, supra note 80, at 901-
908. See also Thro, supra note 89, at 627.
225. Thro, supra note 89, at 627.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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diversity requires a stereotypical analysis of individuals based on
the color of their skin. This argument, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent invalidation of other programs involving racial clas-
sifications, may very well be accepted by other circuits.
Hopwood was likely not the proper case for the Supreme
Court to hear to determine the role of race in admissions pro-
grans.2 3 0 The dual track admissions program in Hopwood clearly
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it used race as the
deciding factor in admissions decisions. The Supreme Court
should decide the constitutionality of an admissions program
which uses race as one factor among many and compares all of the
individual applicants at some point in the process.
In doing so, the Court must decide the validity of Justice Pow-
ell's opinion that race may be used as a factor in admissions pro-
grams to achieve the compelling governmental interest of
educational diversity. If the Court confirms Justice Powell's inti-
mation, the Court should specifically define the "diversity" which
is sought and provide a guideline for the proper role of race in
admissions programs in keeping with the Equal Protection
Clause. Until the Supreme Court clarifies the role of race in
admissions programs, Hopwood will likely precipitate an increase
in rejected applicants challenging the constitutionality of admis-
sions programs for violating the Equal Protection Clause.
Race-neutral alternatives exist to assist the same disadvan-
taged applicants that race-conscious programs are intended to
benefit. In light of the present difficulty that present programs
have with satisfying the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, educational institutions should consider
these alternatives in school admissions programs.
Kevin Joyner
230. Chin, supra note 64, at 887.
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